Polit Famph vol 112.

## BRITONS

Awake, and Look about you;

OR

RUIN the INEVITABLE Consequence of a LAND-WAR, &c.

(Price ONE SHILLING.)



EO

COMPROUPACE OF CELES

(Price Our Samesage,)

### BRITONS

Awake, and Look about you;

OR,

### RUIN

THE

INEVITABLE CONSEQUENCE

OFA

### LAND-WAR,

Whether Successful, or Not.

Humbly recommended to the ferious Consideration of ALL True Britons.

#### By a LOVER of bis Country.

O Navis! referent in Mare Te novi
Fluctus; O quid agis! fortiter occupa
Portum; nonne vides ut
Nudum Remigio Latus,
Et Malus, celeri faucius Africo,
Autennæque gemant?— Hor. Car. L. I. Ode XIV.

#### LONDON:

Printed for G. LION, in Ludgate-Street. MDCCXLIM.

# BRITONS Stone of

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### MIUIA

d II T

INEVITABLE CONSEQUENCE

ATO

### LAND-WAR,

Whether Succession, or Nor.

Humbly recommended to the ferious Confederation of A.L.L. True Legions.

By a Leven of his Country.

O Navis I referent in Mare Te med Austras; O quid agist fortiles occiss Partain; norme mates at Nation Remigio Latins.

Et Males, edget finalie 16 ies. Auswegen gemeint? — 1192. Car, L. I. Ode MIV.

LOVEDOR

Punted for C. Drow, in Tagger & cost, The continue



# BRITONS Awake, and Look about you, &c.

S the War wherein Great Britain is at present engaged, on the Continent, in Behalf of the Queen of Hungary, engroffes almost all our Attention, and all Converfation; as every Company, and every Coffee-House is full of it, and a Man hears of nothing elfe, go where he will; as our Countrymen are fo very intent thereon, that they stand with Ears erest, and big with Expestation, each Post-Night, greedily liftening what News from Germany, as if they thought the Welfare, or Destruction of these Kingdoms, depended necessarily upon it; as we are likely, very foon, to be yet more deeply involved therein, and may possibly, in a little while, from being Auxiliaries to her Hungarian Majesty, become Principals there in ourselves, nay, shall infallibly do so, if the same Wisdom, which has governed our Counfels of late Years, should still have the Direction of them: As this is the Case, at present, we say, it may not be amis, cooly and impartially to confider, what may, in all Probability, be the Consequence of such a Conduct; or rather, what must inevitably be the Fruits

Fruits of any Land-War, without a kind of Miracle.

In fo doing, we shall divest ourselves of all Prejudice and Prepossession; and shall rather avoid setting some Particulars in the strongest Light they will bear, than be guilty of exaggerating them in the least; we shall likewise take Care, not to advance any Thing, which we are not able to prove incontestably, to the Satisfaction of all those, who are not wilfully blind.

In Effect, the true Interest of Great Britain, is so very obvious, to any Person of Common-Sense, and Common-Honesty, that a Man must wink bard, before he can possibly mistake it; and yet there are some certain People, whom we don't expect to convince, by all the Arguments we can possibly use; nay, whom we would not undertake to convince, that the Sun shined, when in its full Height, on the very brightest Day in June, (though its Beams scorched every one else around them) if they were provided, with some weighty Reasons to the contrary, in their Pockets. When we fay, we would not undertake to convince them, we mean, not fo far as to make them own their Conviction; for otherwise it is impossible, but Men, who have Penetration enough on all other Occasions, should be inwardly persuaded of a Truth, which glares in the Eyes, of all the Rest of their Fellow-Subjects; but fuch is the Force of Self-Interest, such is the Depravity of the Generality of Mankind: To this, we owe all the Misfortunes, under which we have groan'd, and languist'd, for these Twenty Years last past; and to this, it is to be feared, we shall still owe many more.

To prevent this, however, as much as lies in our power, and warn those, whom it may chiefly concern, concern, what Dangers may reasonably be apprehended, from the present Situation of our Affairs, is the honest Design of the following Sheets; and if, afterwards, they will run headlong upon their Destruction, though we may ourselves be involved in the general Ruin, together with them, we shall yet have the melancholy Consolation, of having done all, that in us lay, to alarm them, and put them upon their Guard, notwithstanding our Endeavours have prov'd ineffectual.

When a Person has the Misfortune, to be embark'd in a Veffel, which is curfed with either an ignorant or knavish Pilot, who, thro' Want of Skill, or which is as bad, Want of Honesty, he fees, is running her on a Shoal, where she must inevitably be wreck'd, (hoping to fecure himself in the Boat) would it not be fuch a Person's Duty. though he should be but a Passenger, even for Self-Preservation, to warn the Ship's Crew of their Peril; and to endeavour to spirit them up, to save themselves by wresting the Helm out of fuch weak or wicked Hands? Nay, would he not infallibly do fo, if he were truly fensible of his own Danger; unless we could suppose him to be as stupidly indolent, as the Man in the Storm, who being told the Veffel was finking, and defired to help pump, in order to fave her, answered very carelesty, What is it to me, I am but a Passenger? We take our Case, at present, not to be very different from this, and therefore are not willing to have it to reproach ourselves, that we acted the same stupid and indolent Part, with the Wretch before mentioned; but, to return from whence we have digreffed.

That we may be the better able to judge, what must be the probable Consequences of any Land-

War,

War, it will be necessary to consider, First, What is the true Interest of these Kingdoms? 2dly, In what their natural and principal Strength consists? 3dly. How far their true Interest, can be advanced by a Land War? And 4thly, how far their natural Strength is consulted and exerted in such a War.

To begin, then, with the first of these, it will hardly, we believe, be disputed, that as Great-Britain is a trading Nation, the true Interest of these Kingdoms is, to advance and extend our Commerce, with all possible Industry and Diligence; and to cultivate and improve those natural Advantages, with which Providence, (kinder to us than we deferve,) has peculiarly bleffed us, as far as they are capable of Improvement. This being the Cafe, as undoubtedly it is, nothing can be more evident, than that we ought to cultivate the Arts of Peace, by which alone Trade flourishes; and that we ought never to engage in any War, unless it be in Defence of our just Rights and Liberties, or to prevent a manifest and otherwise inevitable Danger; and even in that Case, it is demonstrable, we never ought to involve ourselves in a Land-War.

That peaceable Times only are proper for the Advancement and Extension of our Commerce, is what surely will not be denied, by any Man in his Senses; it is a self-evident Axiom in Politicks; but, when we say so, we would not willingly be misunderstood. In Effect, when we use the Term Peace, we do not mean such a one, as we groan'd under, for many Years, before the Declaration of War with the Spaniards; when they insulted and barrass'd us, as they pleased, with Impunity, whilst our Hands were ty'd up, from either offending them, or defending ourselves. Neither do we

mean such a Peace, as leaves any, even the most diftant Pretence, for keeping up, at Home, a numerous Body of Land-Forces; no, such a Peace is rather more destructive than a War; it has all its. Disadvantages without any of its Advantages. On the contrary, the Peace we mean, is such a one, as not only eases the People of the most burthensome Taxes, such as those upon Coals, Candles, Soap, Leather, and in short, all the immediate Necessaries of Life; but admits of the Reduction of our Army at Home, to the same Number, as it consisted of in the Time of Charles II. or, if that be thought too fevere, as it was in the Reign of Queen Anne, even whilft we were engaged, as Principals, in one of the most vigorous and bloody Wars, that ever was known in Europe.

We take it then for granted, that we can never advance and extend our Commerce, but whilst the Nation enjoys a solid and tasting Peace; and this for divers unanswerable Reasons. That we can never do it in a Time of War is indifputable; for fo far are we from being able to to do, that we always find it evidently decline; nor is this to be wondered at, when we confider the great Charge of Convoys, the tedious Delays frequently attending them, and the beavy Taxes almost inseparable from a State of Hostility: In a Word, it has ever been allowed, that as Plenty is the constant Attendant of Peace, so Poverty is the never-failing Companion of War; which proceeds, entirely, from the certain Stagnation of Trade under the latter, and its prosperous and flourishing Condition under the former.

Nor is it only when the Nation is at open War, that our Trade can neither be advanced nor extended, it will labour under almost as many Difadvantages.

advantages, nay, in some Respects, under more. whilst we enjoy but a precarious, or nominal Peace; because, at such Times, Pretences will never be wanting, for keeping up a numerous Body of Land Forces, besides considerable naval Armaments: And as all this cannot be done, without putting the Publick to an excessive Expence, to defray which, beavy Duties must be laid either upon the Necessaries of Life, or on divers Sorts of Commodities, and perhaps upon both; it is evident, the Manufacturers will not be able, to afford their respective Goods so cheap, as when they don't groan under such Burthens; by this Means, our Neighbours will be enabled to underfell us at foreign Markets, and confequently our Trade must inevitably languish and decline.

Of this melancholy Truth, we have lately had but too undeniable Proofs, for very near Twenty Years, during which we were told, that we enjoy'd a Peace, but had never been without a numerous standing Army, and formidable Squadrons at Sea; tho', for that Time, we heard of nothing but perpetual Depredations, and outragious Insults, with ridiculous and useless, nay, what is more, dishonourable, destructive, and fatal Expeditions: Not to mention long and unnecessary Embargoes, with the frequent issuing of Press-Warrants, (often most unwarrantably put in Execution,) for no other visible Reason, but to distress

the Merchants.

As this was necessarily productive of heavy Duties, and most burthensome Taxes, cou'd it be expected, that Trade should any Ways flourish, during such a Peace? On the contrary, was it at all surprizing, that it should visibly decline; or that several Branches thereof should be almost entirely lost, and that our wiser Neighbours should

have worm'd us out of them? No, this was what every Man of Common-Sense foresaw, but all this could not prevail, on our bonest Premier, to take more salutary Measures; in Effect, it is a general Rule, which will eternally hold good, at all Times, and in all Nations; that as a wife and upright Minister will always conclude a lasting Peace, or push on a War vigorously, unless reduced, by the Success of the Enemy, to accept of disadvantagious Conditions; fo a weak, wicked, and corrupt one, will be continually patching up precarious Treaties, or, if forced into a War, will carry it on in a languid, cowardly and inglorious Manner. Again, a Wise Minister will always endeavour to ease and unite the People, as much as possible, whilst a blundering Profligate, when at the Helm, will be continually fludying, and contriving, to load and barrass them with intolerable Imposts; which he will likewise attempt to bave levied, in the most vexatious and oppressive Manner; as this unhappy Nation has more than once experienced, to her Cost.

From what has been premised, we think it demonstrable, that neither a Time of War, nor an unsettled Peace, can be proper, for the Advancement or Extension of our Commerce; and consequently, that the true Interest of these Kingdoms, must necessarily suffer during either. It is true it may so fall out, that Things may be brought to such an unlucky Crisis, as to render a War unavoidable, and even advisable and eligible, as happened lately with Regard to Spain; but then, it must be observed, that this is only to prevent a greater Evil; and is almost always the Consequence, of some previous Mismanagement, and Male-Administration; as was likewise the Case with Respect to that War; and will again be, if

we should be soon engaged, in an open Rupture with France.

In Effect, it is evident, had we not attack'd the Spaniards in the Mediterranean, in 1718, or had we afterwards accepted of the Mediation between France and Spain, upon the Difference that happen'd between them, on fending back the Infanta, we should nave been so far from meeting with the same ill Usage, as we have since experienced from the Court of Madrid, that we might almost have made our own Terms with them, and have had all imaginable Indulgence,

in our Trade to the West-Indies.

Again, it is as evident, had we kept a watchful Eye, upon all the Steps of France; had we shewn ourselves disposed to act with Vigour, if ever the gave us the least Cause of Complaint; had we declared, upon her first Attempt, to repair the Fortifications, or Port of Dunkirk, that we should look upon it as a Breach of the Treaty of Utrecht, and take our Measures accordingly; had we guarded well, against her stealing our Wool, running in her own Brandies, Teas and Cambricks upon us, or inlisting our Men to recruit her Irish Regiments, we should have had no Reason now, to dread her exorbitant Power; nor would she have dared, to behave, as she has of late Years, had not we acted with fo much Supineness and Indolence.

Notwithstanding, therefore, it was requisite, about four Years ago, to declare War with Spain, and it may be as requisite, very soon, to come to Hostilities with France; this will not prove, that it is the true Interest of these Kingdoms, to be at Variance with either of them; but only that we had brought ourselves, by our blessed Management, into such a bopeful Condition, that it was neces-

fary to have Recourse to Arms, to extricate us out of it, and obtain Redress; as a Man, who had a gangreen'd Limb, would confent to have it scarify'd, or even cut off, in Order to fave his Life, and recover his Health. When any one, by his Debaucheries, or irregular Living, has brought a Surfeit, or Fever upon himself, it will certainly be requisite for him, to have Recourse to proper Remedies, bowever unpalatable; and it may then, in one Senfe, be faid to be his true Interest so to do; but will not every one allow, it would have been much more his true Interest, to have preserv'd his Health, whilst he enjoy'd it, by Temperance and Sobriety? In the like manner, when a Nation has been brought into desperate Circumstances, by weak, or corrupt Management, it may be necessary and advi-Sable, to have Recourse to Arms to retrieve them; and confequently this may be then faid to be her true Interest; but does not every one see, it would have been much more her true Interest, to have prevented her being brought into fuch a Case, by prudent and salutary Measures? War then can never, with any common Sense, be faid to be the true Interest of these Kingdoms, but when it is to avoid a greater Evil, as, to prevent the Invasion of our just Rights, or for the Protection of our Commerce: Whether both these might not better be effected by a vigorous and wife Conduct, is what we shall not at present inquire into. Suffice it now for us, that we have shewn, the Advancement, and Extension of our Trade, to be the true Interest of the British Nation; fuffice it, that we have likewife fhewn, this cannot be expected, either while we are in a State of War, or whilft we enjoy but a precarious or nominal Peace, and this for divers obvious Reafon

Reasons; it will necessarily follow from hence, that we ought never to come to Hostilities, but when our Forbearance will be attended, with yet worse Consequences than a Rupture; and it will still more necessarily follow from hence, that we ought never to engage in such a War, as, whether successful or not, can never prove advantagious to our selves, whatever it may to others: but of this more hereafter.

Come we now to consider, in what the natural and principal Strength of these Realms consists; for, as to the Cultivating and Improving those natural Advantages, with which Providence has peculiarly blessed us, they almost necessarily sollow, from the Advancement and Extension of our Trade, unless we wilfully shut our Eyes: In Effect, all the four Particulars, which we have proposed to weigh, are, in a great Measure, connected and interwoven with each other, though, for the better Illustration of each of them, we have thought proper to take a View of them,

under as many feveral Heads.

The natural and principal Strength, then, of these Realms, (and, indeed, of every State) confifts, first, in a mutual Union of the Subjects among themselves, and the Establishment of a reciprocal Love and Confidence between the Prince, and bis People: 2dly, In our being always able, to fit out fuch a formidable Fleet, when ever it is requisite, and that at as short a Warning as possible, as may Arike a Terror into our Enemies: And 3dly, in the Number of brave Inhabitants, wherewith these Islands are bless'd. That our principal Strength confifts, in our being at Unity amongst ourselves, is what we believe, will scarce be denied by any one; and confequently we should think it quite needless, to advance any Arguments

ments in Support thereof; especially after we have had the Authority of our Saviour, to confirm the Truth of it, who expressly tells us, a Kingdom

divided against itself cannot stand.

We fay, We should think it quite needless, to multiply Words, in Support of this Axiom, but that a bellish Dostrine, has been industriously propagated of late Years, that it is necessary, to keep up the odious Distinctions of Whig and Tory, High and Low Church, for the Security of the Protestant Interest, and the Succession of the Crown in the present Family. That this Doctrine smells strong of the infernal Pit, every one must see; for, that all Division proceeds from the Devil, no one can deny; what, then, do thefe Monsters, these Prostitutes, mean? They would not, they dare not, fure infinuate, that there is no Way of supporting the present Succession, but by going to the D-1; (and yet that is the direct Consequence of this villanous Dostrine;) if so, we must think we have bought it very dear; though, we will not venture to fay, even if that is the Cafe, that we might almost as well have trusted Providence with our Safety, because we know not what Construction, a profligate Sp-c-l J-y, tutor'd by a thorough paced A-y G-l, and directed by an obsequious B-ncb, might be induced to put upon it. In Effect, this would be carrying our Attachment to the Government a very great Length indeed; for, though we have heard, that we ought to venture our Lives, for the Preservation of our King and Country, which certainly is but reasonable, we never heard 'till lately, what this Doctrine evidently inculcates, that we ought to bazard our Souls also for them. -

How unlikely soever, such absurd Tenets were, to prevail on any Man of Common Sense, we have

feen them too successfully inculcated, for many Years, particularly about the Time of Elections. (by those two abandoned Prostitutes, Messieurs Walfingham and Osborn,) to prevent a Coalition of Parties; and hinder the Diffenters from uniting, with the Rest of their independant Countrymen, against the great Leviathan, who so long oppressed us; and whose Safety depended entirely. upon our being a divided People. But, though the Security of a wicked Minister, may depend upon our Divisions, that is, in other Words, our Unhappiness, it is very evident the Welfare, Grandeur and Prosperity of the present Royal Family, is interwoven with ours; our Interests are the fame, and can be promoted by nothing fo much, as an Union among ourselves, and a reciprocal Love and Confidence, between our Sovereign and bis People. Whoever, therefore, by wicked or weak Counsels, goes about to leffen this, or to fet the Nation at Variance amongst themselves, must have some sinister Ends, that will not bear the Light, and is equally a Traitor to his Prince and his Country: Thus much we thought it necessary to fay, in order to fend that hellish Doctrine back, to the Pit from whence it came, and prevent its ever being broach'd again amongst us.

Having thus demonstrated, that our Strength consists, chiefly, in our being united, we shall next proceed to shew, that it consists likewise, in our being able to sit out, on any Emergency, and at a short Warning, such a formidable Fleet, as may strike a Terror into the boldest of our Enemies. This, we think, will never be denied by any one, who considers first, that we are a trading Nation, and must depend upon our Navy, for the Protection of our Commerce; and 2 dly, that we are surrounded by the Sea, and, consequently can neither

be invaded ourselves, nor attack others, but by a naval Armament. In Effect, whilst we are Lords of the Ocean, and united at Home, we may safely defy all Europe, though they should be combined against us; and there is more Truth, than most People are aware on, in those admirable Verses of Mr. Waller;

LORDS of the World's great Waste, the

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Whole Forests send, to reign upon the Sea;
And ev'ry Coast may trouble or relieve,
But none can VISIT US without our Leave.
ANGELS and WE bave this PREROGATIVE.

That none can at our happy Seat arrive; Whilst we descend, at Pleasure, to invade, The Bad with Vengeance, and the Good to aid.

HAPPY, HAPPY Britons, did we know wherein our chief Strength and Happiness consists, and did we exert and promote it accordingly! What might not a King of Great Britain, supported by an united and affectionate People, and truly confulting and promoting their mutual Interest, be able to accomplish? We had almost faid, he might be able to give Laws to all Europe. In Effect, as Trade is the Source of Riches, and Riches the Source of Power, and we have such infinite Advantages over the Rest of Mankind, not only by our bappy Situation, but by the Product of our Country, and which is not the leaft, our excellent Constitution, it is evident, to a Demonstration, we might almost engross the Wealth of the Uni-The Spaniards would be but our Factors, and would possess their Mines, not so much for themselves, as us; nor would even the Dutch be any Thing better, fince they could not carry on their East-India Trade, without our Permission;

and the Product of their Spice Islands might be more ours than their own: In a Word, we might enjoy all the Advantages of that Commerce, without the heavy Clog, of those exquisite Monopolists, (the perpetual Tools of a corrupt Ministry,) the

East-India Company.

Come we now to confider, the third Article, wherein our Strength confifts, namely, in the Number and Bravery of our People: And this, we think, is a Point almost self-evident, and not to be contested; it being generally agreed, that not only the Strength, but the Riches of a State, confifts in the Number of its Inhabitants. cordingly, the Dutch, as politick a Nation as any in Europe, never refuse to naturalize as many as defire it, nor to receive as many as will fettle there. It is true, indeed, they will take Care, not to have any useless Hands amongst them, to lie as a dead Weight upon the Industrious, and they are to be commended for it; if any, therefore, come thither, and neither bring with them, a Sufficiency for their Maintenance, nor are able to sublift themselves by any Business, they are fure to provide them both Work and Sustenance, by putting them into their Rasp-Huys, which answers to our Bridewells; in which Piece of found Policy, it would be well, if we follow'd their Example. Taking it then for granted, that the Strength of any State confifts, in a great Measure, in the Number, and Bravery of its Inhabitants, we shall only observe, that Great-Britain is the most populous, and warlike Nation that is, or perhaps, ever was, for its Extent; that in England alone, exclusive of Scotland, or Ireland, we are reckoned, at the lowest Computation, to amount to seven Millions of Souls; and that, confequently, the Number of able-bodied Men, computing them at the Proportion,

Proportion of one Fourth, is one Million seven hundred and sifty Thousand; out of which might be spared, in Case of Necessity, a Force more than sufficient, not only to repel all Invasions at Home, but to man such a Navy, as with proper Orders, would spread a Terror, and exact Submission, wherever it appeared; such a Navy, as would be able to verify that fine Compliment, of the above mentioned Mr. Waller, to Oliver Cromwell;

Where'er thy Navy spreads her Canvas Wings,

Homage from all, and Wealth to thee she

brings. Another Circumstance wherein our Strength consists, and which we forgot to insist on before, is our being furrounded by the Sea; and, confequently, not liable to any Invasions by Land, nor obliged to keep up any standing Army, or fortify any of our Inland Towns. This is fuch a confiderable Advantage, as we can never too thankfully acknowledge; especially as we are a Proteftant Nation, and there is a Pretender to the Crown of these Realms, a bigotted Papist, who would, otherwise, have been, long ago, supported, with a Force sufficient, to over-run these Kingdoms; whereas we are now more than a Match, for the utmost Power, all our Enemies, in Combination together, can possibly fend against us.

We have now confidered the several Particulars, upon which the Strength of these Kingdoms principally depends; let us next examine, how far our true Interest can be advanced by a Land-War. We have already shewn, wherein our true Interest consists, namely, in the Advancement and Extension of our Commerce; and in Cultiva-

wherewith Providence has peculiarly blessed us. We have already shewn, and we hope to a Demonstration, that any War is diametrically contrary to the Advancement or Extension of our Trade, as it must necessarily occasion beavy Taxes, to defray the Expences of it; and these Taxes, whether laid upon the Necessaries of Liste, or upon our Manusatures, must inevitably raise the Price of them; and consequently enable our Neighbours, who are our Rivals in Trade, to

undersell us, at foreign Markets.

But, if any War is contrary to the Advancement of our Commerce, it is certain, a Land-War is much more so, as it is vastly more expensive, and destructive, by draining us more, of our most useful Men, and our Money, than a War by Sea can do. It cannot therefore be pretended, with any Shew of Reason, that the Prosperity of our Trade is consulted by such a War. As little can it be pretended, that our natural Advantages will be either cultivated or improved thereby; it would be the Height of Assurance to affirm it. In Effect, will any one pretend to fay, that our Woollen Manufactory at Home, will flourish the more for a Land War; that there will more Hands be employ'd therein; that it will meet with more Encouragement; or that a more effectual Stop will be put to that pernicious, and destructive Practice, of Owling, or exporting our Wool, either to our open Enemies, or, which is as bad, our false Friends. We believe, no one will offer, to affert any thing fo abfurd. Again, not to descend to any more Particulars, will any one aver, that our Fishery, especially the Herring - Fishery, that beneficial Branch of our Commerce, which courts us, in a manner, at our own Doors, will be either cultivated,

ted, or improved during a consuming Land-War; no one sure will dare to advance any thing so improbable; the Absurdity of it would stare every one in the Face; we think, therefore, we need not multiply Words, to prove that our true Interest, can never be consulted, or promoted by any such Measure. No, no, it is very evident, whoever's Advantage may be taken Care of, by such a Conduct, that of Great-Britain must suffer egregiously, and be altogether neglected.

Proceed we now to consider, how far our natural Strength is exerted, or consulted, by a Land-War. We have already shewn, that the natural Strength of these Realms consists, in the mutual Union of our Fellow-Subjects amongst themselves; and the Establishment of a reciprocal Love, and Considence, between our Sovereign and us: Now let us see, how these two desirable Ends, are promoted, by engaging us in a War, upon the

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That a Land-War lies beavier upon the Subject, than any other, is manifest for several Reafons; but, to instance only one, it drains us more, not only of our most useful Hands, we mean, our most able bodied Men, but, as if that were not enough, it exhaults our Money also; which is sent abroad, to maintain our Troops, and never returns to us again: Whereas, in a War by Sea, we can never lose so many Men, and far the greatest Part of our Money is expended at Home, amongst ourselves. Now, how our natural Strength, can be faid either to be consulted, or exerted, by a War, which must impoverish us sooner, and more than any other, we must confess ourselves at a loss to discover. That it might possibly occasion a mutual Union, amongst our Countrymen, we will not pretend to deny; but then it would be

be fuch an Union, as, how desirable soever UNITY may be, would be neither to be wish'd for, nor coveted; in short, it would be only an Union of Complaints; an Union in detesting, execrating and abominating, all those weak, or wicked Counfellors, who projected, or agreed to, such a desirable statement of the sta

tructive Measure.

Again, how can this conduce to the establishing a reciprocal Love and Confidence, between the Prince and People, we cannot possibly see; but it might probably produce a quite different Effect: It might create an almost unsurmountable Mistrust and Diffidence between them, which could not but be attended with very melancholy Consequences. For, on the one Hand, when the Nation faw their Sovereign pursuing such Meafures, incompatible with their Welfare, would it not be natural for them to imagine, he had been persuaded, his Interest was very different from theirs? On the other Hand, when the Sovereign found his Subjects, utterly averse to, and murmuring at, those Proceedings, which he had been made, though falfely, to believe, were most for his Advantage, would he not be tempted to suppose, they were, at least, somewhat difrespectful; if he did not go yet farther, and suspect them of Disaffection? It is very evident, nothing could be more natural on both fides; and what might be the Consequence, of such a mutual Jealous, we tremble to think; we shall, therefore, only fay, Heaven forbid, fuch a Misfortune should ever befal us! However, should we ever be so unhappy, as no one can tell what may happen hereafter, it is most certain, whoever were the Advisers of such a pernicious Conduct, or whoever agreed thereto, whether it were through Weakness, or Wickedness, whatever might be their Motives, nothing can be

be more clear, than that they would be equally Traytors to their King and Country; it being an undeniable Truth, that the furest Support of a Throne, is the Love of the Subjects; which can never be preserved, but by pursuing such Measures, as are compatible with, and conducive to

their Welfare and Prosperity.

Another Point, wherein our natural and principal Strength confifts, is, in our being always able, to fit out such a formidable Fleet, at a short Warning, as may firike a Terror into the boldest of our Enemies, and maintain our Empire on the This is an Article that never was disputed by any one; and this, being the Cafe, how can it be pretended, that we either confull, or exert, this natural Strength, by a Land-War? Or, how can it be faid, that fuch a War conduces towards afferting our Dominion on the Seas? Is it not evident, that it cannot do either of these? And, confequently, is it not evident, that, by carrying on a War upon the Continent, we should give our Enemies a great Advantage over us, and neglest that very Circumstance, wherein alone our Superiority confifts. In Effect, does not every one know, that we are not able to cope with them by Land, unless we are vigorously supported by a very powerful Alliance, which is by no means to be depended on; whereas we are fingly more than a Match for them, upon the watry Element? It must, therefore, be little less than Infatuation, should we engage in a War, wherein we should labour under all Manner of Disadvantages, whilst, by attacking our Enemies by Sea, we should be able to do them infinitely more Prejudice, and reduce them to Reason much sooner, with incomparably less Hazard, and Expence, to ourselves.

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A third Point wherein our Strength confifts, is, in the Number and Bravery of our Countrymen; but this, though an exceeding great Advantage, if rightly managed, as to defend ourselves when invaded, to man our Navy, or to carry on our Manufactures, &c. can be but of little Service to us, if we pursue wrong Measures. For Instance, in Case of an Invasion, it would be impossible for our Enemies, if they should escape our Fleet, to pour in so many Men upon us, but what we should be able, by our Numbers, to cut them all in pieces, in a few Days, were we but united, and our Militia ever so little disciplined. Again, were it necessary to carry on a Sea-War, we have Hands more than enough to man our Navy, and defeat any Force, that could be brought against us; not only so, but whatever Losses we might suffer in such a War, we should be able, for many Years, to find fufficient Numbers to recruit them, and all this without fo far draining our Country, as to leave it destitute, of the Hands requifite, for Tilling the Ground, carrying on our Manufactures, and fuch like necessary Uses.

But the Case would be widely different, should we resolve to attack a Power, by Land, whose Dominions, being of much larger Extent than these Realms, should enable him, not only, to send his Hundreds of Thousands into the Field, but constantly to recruit, whatever Losses he might suffer, by Defeats, or Desertion; as populous as these Kingdoms are, we should soon find ourselves no Match for such an Enemy; for, though we might, at first, be able to oppose him with as numerous an Army, the many Thousands it would require each Campaign, to keep it up, would be such a continual Drain, upon our Country,

Country, as must leave it, in a Manner a deferted, in a few Years, and exhaust all the Flower of the Nation: So that we must, at last, sink under the Burthen, whilst our Enemy, though he might suffer equal, or even greater Losses than ourselves, might be able, through the greater Extent of his Dominions, not only to retrieve, but to bear up under them, and, in the End, overwhelm us,

by meer Dint of Numbers.

A melancholy and fatal Example of this Truth, and at the same Time, an useful Lesson to all fucceeding Princes, we have feen, within our Memory, in the Person of the unfortunate, and ill-advised Monarch, Charles XII. King of Sweden: Who, though he met with uninterrupted Success. for many Years together, against all his Enemies, had so effectually exhausted his Country, by his continual Wars, that, upon his receiving one single Defeat, at Pultowa, he was irrecoverably ruined; whilst his Enemy, the Czar, though he had been constantly worsted, in every Engagement, and on all Occasions, was enabled, by the superior Extent of his Territories, not only to bear up under his Losses, but, at last to vanquish his Conqueror. Should any one alledge, that this Hero's Ruin was not owing, to his attacking a Prince, fo much his Superior, by his vast Dominions, and the Numbers of his Men, but to his retiring into Turkey, we beg he would confider, that, by all Accounts, his Kingdom was so much drained of its most useful Hands, that the very Women were forced to till the Ground, drive their Carriages, ply upon their Rivers, and, in short, perform all those laborious Offices, for which the most robust Men alone were proper; that, consequently, had he not taken Refuge in Turkey, had he even continued successful, for some Time longer, his

his very Victories must have undone him, in the End, by depopulating his Country; which has not yet recover'd, the Damage it suffer'd, by so

imprudent a Conduct.

Another material Point, wherein our principal Strength confifts, and to which we ought to have an Eye, in all our Undertakings, is, that we are Islanders, surrounded by the Sea; an Advantage, without which, all others would avail us very little. But this Advantage, how great foever, may be render'd of no Effect, by ill Conduct: For Instance, the same bappy Situation, which renders it impossible for any, or all our Enemies, to invade us, with any Probability of Success, provided we are tolerably united, renders it equally impracticable for us, to make any Attacks upon them by Land, without labouring under all Manner of Disadvantages. The only War, from which we can promife ourselves any Success, or derive any good, is a War by Sea; by fuch a War, we can annoy our Enemies more, than by any other; and, by fuch a War, we can better repel any Attacks made upon us by them; it follows, confequently, that our natural Strength can never be either exerted, or confulted, by engaging in any War, upon the Continent.

Accordingly, we defy all Mankind, to point out any one single Advantage, that can possibly refult to us, from such an absurd and preposterous Conduct, to call it by no barder Name; whereas the Prejudice, we may receive from thence, is insinite, and evident. It is agreed on all Hands, we do not want to make any Conquests, by Land; it is not our Interest so to do; and if we should be so weak as to desire it, our Allies themselves (if we have any worth calling so,) would not consent thereto, but would oppose it: What Busi-

mess then can we have, to involve ourselves in a War, which probably may be excessively detrimental, if not absolutely ruinous, and cannot

possibly be of any Service to us?

To descend from Generals to Particulars, the only Motives, that have been openly avow'd, for our engaging so deeply, in the present War in Germany, are to restore Peace to the Empire, and support the Queen of Hungary. Very specious Pretences, we must confess! and which carry a pretty plausible Appearance, to those who look no farther than the Outside of Things; but which will, by no means, be satisfactory, to any bonest and thinking Briton, if we have still any such left amongst us; which, by what we have seen happen, within these two Years, we are almost

tempted to question.

If it should be pretended, that the latter of these, namely, the Support of the Queen of Hungary, was really one of the Motives, for our entering so deeply into the present War, several Difficulties will arise, which, we are afraid, it would puzzle some of our wifest Heads to solve. In the first Place, why was it so long delay'd? Why did we fuffer her Hungarian Majesty, to be brought to the very Brink of Ruin, before we offered to affilt her? Why did we fit still, and fee her Dominions so cruelly barrassed, and her whole Strength and Wealth, in a Manner, exhaufted, before a fingle Man was order'd, to move to her Relief? Is it not evidently owing only to a Miracle, and to the visible Interposition of the Divine Providence, in her Behalf, that her whole Inheritance was not entirely swallowed up, whilst we continued quiet Spectators, of the Barbarity and Injustice, of her merciless, and cowardly Enemies?

If therefore, it was expedient, or necessary for us, to affift her at all, does not every one see, it would have been more adviseable, to have done it sooner? Either it was, or it was not, requisite, to espouse ber Interest, and save ber from sinking: If it was not, why have we armed now, so many Thousands in her Quarrel? And, if it was, does not every one fee, we might have done it, at lefs Expence, and with infinitely less Hazard, whilft the was herself able, to make a vigorous Struggle in her own Defence, than at present, when she has suffered so much, from the Ravages of her Oppressors, and lost fuch Numbers of her choicest Men? What shall we say to such monstrous Politicks? Or rather, what will all the World think of fuch absurd Conduct? Did we suffer that glorious Princess, to be reduced so low, and her Enemies to triumph so long over her, only to show Mankind, we can still pull down the latter, and restore the former, to her pristine Splendor, by the superior Force and Bravery, of the invincible Armies of Great-Britain and Hanover? Such a Piece of Knight-Errantry might found very well in a Romance, but will make a very indifferent Appearance in History.

Again, when it was once resolved to assist her Hungarian Majesty, why were the sixteen thousand Hanoverians, which we had so prudently taken into our pay, about the Beginning of last Winter, ordered down to Flanders, where, it was known, they could be of no Service; and why were they not sent after Maillebois, to barrass bim in his March, and prevent the Retreat of the French Forces; which being cooped up in Prague, must have been either cut in Pieces, famished, or made Prisoners at Discretion? But that Punning may seem too ludicrous, upon so melancholly a subject,

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we would fain ask, where was the Discretion, of

fuch unaccountable Measures?

Shall it eternally be truly faid, by Foreigners. to the Reproach of our Country, that the English have, indeed, Abundance of Wit, but then it is only After-wit? Shall we always resemble the late Lord Wharton's Pupples, by never opening our Eyes, 'till we are downright finking? Are not all Evils, if foreseen in time, to be prevented, at an easier and cheaper Rate, than they can be remedied afterwards? Did we never before discover, that the Power of France, was growing formidable to Europe? Have not the Gentlemen, in the Opposition, alarmed us frequently, for many years, with Representations of its continual Increase? Are not divers of their Speeches yet extant? Nay. have not all the Public Writers, except those Proftitutes in the Pay of the M\_y, taken the Alarm, and echoed the impending Danger, throughout the Kingdom? And what has been the Consequence thereof? Were not both the One, and the Other represented, at one Time, as seditious and disaffected Persons, who were perpetually disturbing the Tranquillity of the Nation, by infusing into them vain Fears, of imaginary and chimerical Perils, that existed no where, but in their own Brain? Whilst our wise, bonest, and sagacious M-r, perfifted in still contributing, by every Step he took, towards the Aggrandizement, of that our natural Enemy, regardless of all that could be faid against it. And, at another Time, when the Danger was become too visible to be denied, was not the Note changed; and was not this very Danger urged against us, and but too successfully, for many years, to prevent our taking Revenge, of a cruel, cowardby, and despicable Nation, who had not only infultea, and plunder'd us, but committed the most in folens

insolent and provoking Outrages, equally to the Dishonour of our Sovereign and his Subjects?

Was not, we say, this the very Case? Was not the Danger of incensing France, urged, with too much Success, to prevent our declaring War against Spain, in our own Cause? Nay, was it not even said, that we must not dare to intercept or seize the Galleons, though we should come to a Rupture with Spain, because the French had the greatest Share of Property therein, and would not suffer it?

Did we not wink at the Marquis D'Antin's Expedition to the Baltick, though it was openly declared, that one Part of his Business was to sound our Coasts; and though it put us to the Charge, of fitting out a peaceable Squadron, to prevent any finister Designs, that might be concealed under that Pretence? Did we not even wink at his second Expedition to the West-Indies, and suffer him to proceed so far thereon, before we fent any Ships after him, that, had not Providence interposed in our Favour, not only Admiral Vernon and his Squadron must have been swallow'd up, by the united Navy of France and Spain, but, probably, Sir Chaloner Ogle himself, with his Fleet, must likewife have fallen a Sacrifice, in the fecond Place? Is any one so weak, as to imagine, the Marquis D'Antin would not have affifted the Spaniards, could he but have joined them, before the Arrival of Sir Chaloner? And was it not owing entirely to contrary Winds, that he did not? Is it not evident, by the Conduct of the Marquis, in returning immediately to Europe, when he found bis Design frustrated, by the Junction of our Admirals, that this was the fole End of his Voyage? Or do we believe the French were fond, of copying after our wife Example, in fitting out peaceable Squadrons

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drons, and putting the Public to unnecessary Expence, to persuade their Enemies into Compliance, with their Desires? Was not the whole Nation, so universally convinced, that the French Fleet were sent to join the Spaniards, and fall, with their united Force, upon Admiral Vernon, that we all gave him over for lost? Was it not even suggested, that it was the Desire of some Persons, at Home, who hore that gallant Officer no good Will, and were utterly averse to our declaring War, that he might be deseated? In Effect, might it not be truly said of him, on that Occasion, as was, on another, of Queen Elizabeth, that the Elements sought for him. And might not this Compliment be justly apply'd to him?

O! nimium dilette Deo, cui militat Æther, Et conjurati veniunt ad Classica venti!

Claudian.

Was not this, we fay again, the real Case? And did we not wink at all these gross Affronts, rather than draw upon us the Power of France, in our own Cause? Nay, did we not even wink at her building diverse Batteries, near Dunkirk, on pretence of guarding ber Coasts, from Insults, to avoid breaking with her, on any Account, though our own Interest was in Question? And are we now, wantonly, bringing her Arms upon us, without any fresh Provocation, and that in another's Quarrel, and (what is yet worse) in a consuming Land-War? Amazing Change! Or rather, monstrous Inconsistence, in our Counsels! But, what shall we fay, We hope, we are not as yet fallen under that heavy Curse, Quos Deus vult perdere prius dementat.

In Effect, either our past Conduct, for, at least, these dozen Years, was weak and destructive, or our present Measures must be so; and some, per-

haps, may be fo malicious to infinuate, neither of them are much better. But, however that may be, this is evident, granting the former to be the Case, if we are now to act the Part of Penelope, by pulling down what we have been fo long building up, and running counter to all our Measures for that Time, one Step more was absolutely necessary, even for our own Vindication; namely, the making a publick Recantation, by disclaiming and disavowing our past Conduct; by owning we had been imposed on, and betray'd; and (which likewife necessarily follows) by an Impeachment, and vigorous Prosecution, of those, who had thus misled, betray'd, and imposed upon us, with all their Tools, and Abettors, be they ever so nu-This, we fay, was absolutely necessary, if we defired to create any Confidence, either in our Allies, if fuch we still have, or in our People at Home: For, otherwise, if we skreen and protect the Trayors, whilst we condemn their Treasons; if we suffer them to enjoy with Impunity the Fruits of their Villany, whilft we are groaning under the Misfortunes, and Pressures occasioned by their pernicious Proceedings; if we allow them to revel in insolent Joy, and Plenty, whilst the whole Nation are almost starving, and mourning their wretched Condition; we may talk of our Wisdom; we may boast of our Bravery; and we may prate if we please, of our Liberty; but the first will be DESPISED, the second PITIED, and the third LAUGH'D at, by all Europe.

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Come we now, to the other Motive, for engaging in the present War, namely, that of restoring Peace in the Empire; and let us see whether the Matter will be much mended? We are afraid not. In the first Place, most of the Questions before asked, if not all of them, might again be repeated

repeated as properly here, and it would be equally difficult, to give a satisfactory Answer thereto; not only fo but besides those, some other Objections, might be started, by an ill-natured Querift, which it would not be found an easy Task to remove. For Instance, how comes Great-Britain, which, being an Island, can be but remotely, if at all, affected thereby, more concerned, in Re-establishing the Peace of the Empire, than divers of the Princes of Germany, and even some of the most powerful; though their Dominions are situated therein; and, being themselves Members of it, their Welfare and Safety must be look'd upon, as inseparable from that of the Germanick-Body; and yet feem, to trouble themselves very little, about the present War.

There are but two Ways, by which, this their indolent Behaviour can possibly be accounted for; the One is by faying, that they do not apprehend the Safety of the Empire, as a Body, to be at all in Danger, at this Juncture, and then it will follow, of Course, that we had no Business to interfere in the War. The other is, by frankly confessing, that, finding us, to be at all Times so ready, to be the Don Quixotes, and Dupes of Europe, they are resolved, to lay the whole Burden upon us. Now which of these may be Case, we will not pretend to determine; but this we will venture to supposing the former to be the affirm; that, Truth, we are acting a very imprudent Part; and supposing it to be the latter, whatever may be the Issue thereof, it will not redound much to our Honour, or Interest, to be constantly the Bubbles, and Jack-pay-for-alls of every Power on the Continent. In Effect, it is very evident, it is in this Light, our Neighbours at present look upon us; it would, otherwise, have been impossible, that the Dutch, who

who, had the Queen of Hungary been overwhelmed, must infallibly have fallen a Sacrifice the next, could have remained so long, such quiet and unconcerned Spectators, of a War, on the Event of which, their own Security immediately

depended.

Having mentioned the Dutch, we cannot help making one Observation, with Regard, to their Behaviour to us of late Years, which has equally raised our Astonishment, and Indigation; it is this, that we have not been able, to prevail on them to join with us, in any one Measure, unless we should except the Suppression of the Ostend Company, (wherein they were more than equally concerned, in Point of Interest, with ourselves) and in the present War, if they can properly be said as yet to have joined us. We fay, this has equally raised our Indignation and Astonishment; the one, at the Slight put upon us, and the Indignity offer'd us; (not to mention their gross Ingratitude to a Nation, which has fo often prevented their being swallowed up,) the other, that our incomparable Statesmen have never bethought themselves of a Way, tocompel them to it, and that almost at any Time. Let but the Minister of Great-Britain, who resides at the Hague declare peremptorily, in his Master's Name, that He will renounce all Alliance with them, and leave them to the Mercy of France, unless they will cordially espouse our Interests, and unite their Forces, against our common Enemies, as the French ever were, and ever must be, and they will not stand long besitating about it: In Effect, they, would then, have but thefe two Ways to choose; either to throw themselves directly, into the Arms of France, and become a Province to her, or, to join Heart and Hand with us; and which of these would

would be the most eligible, we leave any one to

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To return, however, from whence we have digress'd, we would fain ask another Question; namely, how has the Empire deferved it at our Hands, that we should interest ourselves so deeply in its Welfare? We confess, we know of no Obligation we have to it, nor, indeed, of any we possibly can have. We know, on the contrary, that it owed its Safety to us, at the ever-memorable Battle of Hochstedt; when our victorious Army, defeated the ambitious Views of the common Enemy of Europe, at an infinite Expence both of Blood and Treasure; for which we were amply rewarded, no doubt, by a few bloody Rags, some of which still hang up in Westminster Hall: But, how this Benefit, conferred thereon by us, at fo dear a Rate, should lay us under a fresh Obligation, of conferring more, and probably, at as exorbitant a Price, we must own, we cannot perceive.

In Effect, who was it lighted up the Flames of War in the Empire, and carried Fire and Sword, into the Dominions of the Queen of Hungary? Was it not the Elector of Bavaria? A Prince, who has always been in the Interest of the common Enemy and Incendiary of Europe, and who has trod exactly in the Steps of his deceafed Father? And did not the Empire, nevertheless, choose this Prince as their Head, and thereby enable him the more, to lay waste, and spread Desolation through, great Part of the Territories of her Hungarian Majesty? Did not most of the Princes affift the Emperor in fo doing, and do not many still support him with Men or Money? Who then can they bave to blame, but themselves, for the Ravage and Devastation of the Empire?

And what Business have we to intermeddle therewith? Must they light up Fires, and must we be at the Expence and Trouble of extinguishing them? As to the Emperor himself, we think he is so far from being to be pitied, that we are of Opinion, he deserves, yet worse than he has yet met with; and should not be sorry, to see him reduced to take Refuge in France, as his Father did before him.

To speak the Truth, the House of Bavaria have, for many Years, been the never failing Tools, of the House of Bourbon; and, though we bear no Ill-will to the Bavarians, as a People, yet, as they are continually made the Instruments, of their Prince's unjust Schemes to embroil Europe, and are thereby render'd subservient, to the ambitious and wicked Designs of the Court of Versailles, we think, it would be for the Benefit of Christendom, if both they, and the French, were almost exterminated, as the Pests of Society, and common Enemies of Mankind. Perhaps this may found very ill-natured in the Ears of some People, and we may be cenfured as bigbly inhuman; but, if they would weigh the Matter rightly, they would foon be convinced to the contrary; and would know, we are governed in our Opinion, by this equitable Rule,

Quam necis artifices arte perire sua.

In Effect, if either the French, and Bavarians, or all the Rest of Europe, must be ruined; if they have constantly endeavoured to embroil all Christendom; if the whole Tenor of their Conduct, for many Years, has been the same, and they have never wanted the Will, when they have had the Power; if their Princes, within these fourscore Years, have been the Cause, of shedding as much Blood,

Blood, and destroying as many Men, as both their Dominions contain, (which we verily believe they have;) and if their Subjects are always ready, to execute their very worst Commands, we think, it will hardly admit of any Dispute, which ought to suffer.

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That we have not aggravated Matters, in this Representation of the Case, will evidently appear, if we consider, how often, within that Time, they have called the Turks into the Empire, and what Numbers, on both Sides, loft their Lives on those Occasions; if we reflect, likewise, what Seas of Blood were shed by them, on Account of the Succession to the Crown of Spain, whereon they perfidiously seized, contrary to all Laws buman and divine; if we reflect, on their spiriting up the Spaniards, to seize on Sicily, in 1718, the preventing of which has caused the War between them and us ever fince; together with their successful Invasion of both Naples, Sicily and Milan, in 1734, in Conjunction with the Kings of Spain and Sardinia, whom they also drew into that War; their bribing the Cardinal Primate of Poland, with several of the Grandees, to elect Stanislaus, the' contrary to his Defire, merely to make his Election a Bone of Contention, and to fet all Europe in a Flame; their spiriting up the Swedes since, to fall upon the Muscovites, and the Kings of Prussia and Poland, with the Elector of Bavaria, to attack the Queen of Hungary; if we reflect on all these, we fay, and the Millions of Lives, loft on all Sides thereby, we shall find, we have not exceeded the Bounds of Probability, in faying, the French and Bavarians have been the Occasion, of destroying as many Men, as both their Dominions contain: We have passed over their persidious

dious Invasion of the Seven Provinces, which they almost over-ran in the Reign of Charles II, and their more persidious and inhuman Behaviour, on Pretence of being Mediators, in Corsica, with the Blood shed on those Occasions, because we

would not inflame the Reckoning.

To return then, from whence we have again digressed, we have seen, that, whether our engaging in the prefent War, be afcribed to our Defire, of Supporting the Queen of Hungary, or of Restoring Peace to the Empire, our Conduct must appear both weak, and unaccountable, to all sensible, and unprejudiced Persons. would the Matter be much mended, should we add a third Motive, and fay it was necessary, to prevent the Overthrow of the Ballance of Power, in Europe; because it is notoriously known, that the whole Tenor of our Conduct, for above these Twenty Years, has had a visible Tendency, to aggrandize France, and weaken the House of Austria; which, every one, who did not wilfully shut bis Eyes against Conviction, was sensible could not fail, of effectually destroying the Ballance of Power.

This was fo manifest, that some Persons have pretended to account for it, by saying, that the Greatness of the Austrian Family, was look'd upon with invidious Eyes, by a certain G-rm-n Prince; that he was, therefore, desirous, of bringing it down to his own Level; and that he found the Means, to prevail upon our M—ry, to join with him, in this detestable and destructive Project; which has, accordingly, been put in Execution but too successfully. We must own, were we to judge by Appearances, and the present Posture of Affairs, we should be tempted to believe this; but then we can't help thinking, that an Impeach-

ment, must have been the necessary Consequence, of our Change of Measures, were it only to vindicate the Nation in general, from having consented to a Design so execrable, and so contrary to our true Interest: As no such Thing, therefore, has been attempted, we must conclude, there are no

Grounds, for fuch a Suggestion.

What gave Rife to this Suggestion, we suppose, was this; that the People, not being able to account for our late Conduct, and particularly, for one Step, which they thought wholly inconfiftent with the Interest of these Kingdoms, were willing to ascribe it to the Regard, some Persons had for a certain Country, for whose Advantage alone it feem'd calculated: But they never confider'd, that, though such a Regard, might be very excufable, and natural, in those Persons, it was quite the Reverse, and absolutely unpardonable in some others; because it shew'd, they were utterly unmindful, and regardless, of the Welfare of another Country, for which they were bound, by the AriEtest Tyes of Duty, and Nature, to have the most tender Concern.

We chuse, therefore, rather to suspend our Judgment, till we can have better Information,

what were the real Motives, which induc'd us, now, to engage so precipitately, in a War upon the Continent, than be guilty, of passing a rash Censure, upon the Counsels of those, for whose Wisdom, and Integrity, we would willingly retain the utmost Veneration. But, nevertheless, we cannot help observing, it is somewhat amazing, the present Land-War, wherein we are as yet only Auxiliaries, should have so much engrossed all our Care, and Attention, that the War with Spain, wherein we are Principals, and in the Success thereof, we are infinitely more nearly concerned, should be wholly negletted, and in a Manner, forgot. It must be confessed, to our eternal Honour, that we are certainly the most generous, and difinterested Nation, that ever was, in thus preferring the Advantage of our Allies, to our own; we should be glad, if we could see any of them, who were fond of following our Example; but they are wifer, than to imitate us, in fuch Knight-Errantry.

Will it be faid, in Justification of this strange and unaccountable Conduct, that the whole Nation called out loudly upon us, to affift her Hungarian Majesty? Supposing it should be granted; would this be a fufficient Excuse? Not in the least? We own, it was a very popular Measure; we own, the Britons, who are naturally a brave, and generous People, could not bear to fee that injured, and gallant Princess, so basely and unjustly oppressed, and overwhelm'd, by such Numbers of treacherous and cowardly Enemies, who, without any Provocation, invaded her Dominions, on all Sides, with Fire and Sword, without wishing Providence might raise her up some Protector, to Support ber Cause; But does this prove, we defired fo many British Regiments, should be transported

ported to Flanders, at an infinite Expence; and that we should take Sixteen Thousand Hanoverians into our Pay, almost a Year before we wanted them, to fight, in a Manner, their own Quarrel? We fay, their own Quarrel; for, that they were much more nearly concerned therein, than we, nobody can deny. As little does it prove, that we were willing, our own Interest should be entirely neglected, or postponed; or that, while we are maintaining a powerful Squadron, in the Mediterranean, for the Protection of the Territories of Sardinia and Tuscany, the Spaniards should be suffered, almost unmolested, to take our Merchant-Ships, and every Week should bring an Account of fresh Captures; which might long ago have been prevented, in a great Measure, by sending a small Squadron, to St. Sebastian's, to demolish that Nest of Pyrates; or, at least, to burn all the Privateers in that Harbour.

No, this was fuch preposterous Conduct, as could never have been foreseen, or, if it had, would never have been approved of. We grant, we were willing the Queen of Hungary should be affifted; but then it was by timely Remittances in Money; with which she could have bired Troops, not only, at a much easier Rate than we possibly can, but such Troops, as she might have had much sooner, and which, being absolutely at her own Command, would have done her much more effectual Service, than any In the mean while, if we were willing to go yet farther, a formidable Fleet might have made a powerful Diversion, by keeping the Coasts of France, in a continual Alarm, which would, at once, have answered two good Ends; one, by obliging them, to keep a large Body of Forces, upon their Sea Coasts, and interrupting their Commerce, which, of itself, would have been highly advanta- $D_3$ 21045

gious to us; the other, by scowring our Channel, and securing our Merchant-Ships, from any Spanish Privateers, or, which is as bad, from the French, under the Difguise of Spaniards; we might add a third Advantage, which would have resulted to us, from so judicious and prudent a Conduct; namely, we should either mot bave beard, of the Refortifying Dunkirk, in express Violation, of the Treaty of Utrecht, or might have effectually prevented it, by a timely Visit, before it had been too far advanced. There was yet another Way of distressing the French, which would have gall'd them confiderably, and that is, by procuring Commissions from her Hungarian Majesty, to fit out Privateers, under ber Colours; which would, nevertheless, have been no Breach of Peace, nor any more than the Lex Talionis, as they have done the fame by us, feveral Times.

We confess, indeed, if we must always be burthened, with the same namerous Land-Army, as of late Years, we should choose much rather, to have them employ'd, in fighting for our Allies abroad, than in spreading Idleness, and Debauchery, by their Examples, at Home, throughout the Kingdom. But it was expected, long ago, that we should have been relieved from this Grievance; and though no Ease could be obtained, during the Influence of our late Grand-Vizier, it was generally believed, this would have been, the agreeable first Fruits, of a Change; nay, though we found ourselves disappointed herein, Nobody doubted, but it would have been complied with, before it was attempted, to lay any farther Load upon the Publick, in Favour of any Ally whatever; fo willing were we to wait with Patience, and not be too pre-

cipitate in censuring.

To our Sorrow, however, we were mistaken egregiously, and have seen a Change of Hands, with very little Alteration of Measures: So contagious is a bad Example! especially when no Punishment has been inflicted on the first Offender. Nevertheless, though we have taken one false Step. and there is no Likelyhood, we should recede from it, at least, if we are guided by the same wife Counsels, as of late, till the Back of the Nation is quite broken, we will venture to lay it down, as an unalterable Maxim, with Respect to these Kingdoms, that, whenever we would exert our natural Strength, to the greatest Advantage, and annoy our Enemies the most, with the least Expence, and Hazard to ourselves, we must begin, with Disbanding our Land-Forces, and Taking off our most burthensome Taxes: We must, then, necessarily, reign Lords of the Ocean; and, though our own Trade, might labour under seme Difficulties (which is the constant Effect of War,) that of our Neighbours would labour under yet more; which would make them foon willing, to give us reasonable Satisfaction.

In Effect, the Case is widely altered, between us and the French, since the late War; during that, we had a pretty flourishing Trade, and the French scarce any; so that, we had a great Deal to lose, and scarce any Thing to get: (And yet even then, by a right Management, we might have made them soon weary of it:) Whereas now, as they are our Rivals, and that too successfully, in most of our Branches of Trade, (wherein they have, in a great Measure, supplanted us,) they have as much, or more to lose than we, and, by Reason of our Superiority at Sea, must necessarily suffer the most. If we must engage in a War, therefore, at any Time, (which, as has been already shewn, we ought ne-

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ver to do, but for the Prevention of a greater Evil, as the Interruption of our Commerce, or Violation of our just Rights, let us carry it on, in such a Manner, as to annoy our Enemies the most, and that with the least Hazard and Expence, and the greatest Probability of Advantage, to ourselves.

Should we not think any Man, little better than mad, who, being bimself but of small Stature, and weak, and having a Quarrel to decide, with an Adversary of Twice bis Strength, (with whom, however he could very well cope, either at Small-Sword or with Fire-Arms,) if, having it in his own Power, to choose his Weapons, the should decline using those, which rendered him a Match for his Antagonist, and vain-gloriously, rashly, and foolishly, should offer to engage bim, at Fifty-Cuffs, wherein the other had visibly the Odds on his Side? Should we not fay fuch an obstinate Wretch, was infatuated, and bigbly deserved, to be heartily drubbed, in order to bring Him to bis Senses? This would certainly be the Opinion, of every reasonable Man; nor would any one, either assist or pity bim, though reduced to the most deplorable Condition; but bid him thank bimself. Just as weak and absurd, is the Conduct of Great-Britain, in Engaging in a War by Land, with any Power upon the Continent.

But, perhaps, it will be faid, we could not, any other Way, so effectually support her Hungarian Majesty; and that we were bound to assist ber, as Guarantees of the Pragmatic Sanction: Let us examine, therefore, what Truth there would be, in such a Suggestion; Supposing then a timely Remittance, of Two Millions of Florins, over and above what has already been granted her, had been made to that Glorious Princess, at the Beginning of the War; and supposing the Hanoverians had paid their own Troops, which, as their Country is more

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they ought to have done: Supposing we, in the mean while, had sent a powerful Squadron, with Five, or Six Thousand Soldiers, and a proper Number of Bomb-Ketches, to keep the Sea-Coasts, of France, in a continual Alarm, and carry Terror and Desolation, wherever they appeared; would not such a Diversion, with the infinite Damage they might have done, and the almost total Interruption of their Commerce, have obliged the French to send such Numbers, to man their Coasts, as would have weakened their Army more, than any other Measure we can take? This, we believe, will hardly be disputed; but Foresight, and sound Policy, are very seldom the Characteristicks of a B—t—sh

Accordingly, we faw ours, continue wholly unconcerned and indolent, whilft the Kings of France, Spain, and Sardinia, in Conjunction, invaded the Dominions, of our ancient Ally the Emperor, on every Side; stript him of all his Possessions in Italy; and reduced him to the last Extremity; to extricate himself from which, his Imperial Majesty, was forced to agree, to the Cession of the Dutchy of Lorain to France; to which he had prevailed on the Duke to confent, in Confideration of his Marriage with the Archdutchess, now Queen of Hungary, and the eventual Sucession, to the Dutchy of Tuscany. This considerable Aggrandizement, of our natural Enemy, they beheld, we fay, with the utmost Unconcern, at the same Time that they saw the Ballance of Power, in Europe, entirely overthrown, by the so great Weakening of the House of Austria, in the Loss of Milan, Naples, and Sicilies. All this did our then worthy Ministry, look on, with Indifference; whilst the Prostitutes, whom they kept in pay, to cast a Mist before the Eyes of the People, and poison their Minds, were not ashamed, to be daily inveighing against the Treaty of Utrecht, for having left the House of Bourbon too formidable, and not having sufficiently provided

for the Ballance of Power.

But submitting it to wifer Heads, and to those, whom it may more immediately concern, by what Motives those Gentlemen were influenced, at that Time, we shall now proceed to consider, what we at first proposed, namely, what must be the probable Consequences of our engaging in a Land-War: And in order to fet this in a clearer Light, we shall examine, First, whether any Advantages, can possibly accrue to us from thence, and Secondly, what Detriment we may in all likelyhood, apprehend from it. As to the former, we defy all Mankind, to point out one fingle Advantage, we can reap from it; we may, indeed, gain Victories, and take Towns, but will this be of any Service to ourselves? No, the Expence of Blood and Treasure will be left to us, as has always been in former Wars; whilst the Benefit will redound solely to our Allies.

In short, it would puzzle any one, to say, what Benefit we can propose to ourselves, from this extraordinary Step. Will it increase or extend our Trade? No one will have the Impudence to affirm it. Will it enrich the Nation? Quite the contrary; it will greatly impoverish us, by continually draining from us our Money, and our most useful Hands. Will it secure us from the Depredations of the Spaniards, or obtain better Terms for us, from those baughty and cruel Enemies? Just the Reverse; whilst we are exerting our whole Strength, in Support of the Queen of Hungary, at the Expence of our best Blood and Treasure, they will have the fairest Opportunity to exert themselves,

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by Redoubling their Outrages, and Putting their Possession in America, into such a Condition, not to fear any Insults: So that, in Proportion, as we grow weaker, they will grow stronger, and confequently, will be the less likely to recede, from their insolent Pretensions. What a bopeful Prospect is this for Great-Britain! If, then, a Land-War, will neither extend our Trade, enrich the Nation, secure us from the Depredations and Insults of our Enemies, nor obtain us any better Terms from them; what Advantage, in the Name of Wonder, do we pro-

pose to ourselves from thence?

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Perhaps, it may be answered, we shall obtain bonourable Terms for her Hungarian Majesty, after which, we shall be at Liberty, to exert ourselves, in our own Behalf, and push on the War, with Vigour, against the Spaniards. Shall we so! We are heartily glad of it truly! We thought, however, in common Prudence, we ought first to have taken Care of our own Concerns; and then to have considered about assisting our Allies. But what have a generous, disinterested British M---y, to do with Common Prudence. And yet, what would they fay to a Man, who, when bis own House, and that of a distant Neighbour, were both in a Flame, at the same Time, should run to help extinguish the latter, and leave his own to be confumed? Should not they, and all the World, pronounce him a Madman? And are not we now adding the very same Part? In Effect, supposing, we were not only to obtain, the most bonourable Terms, for the Queen of Hungary, (which yet is somewhat doubtful,) but should be so successful, as to recover, for Her, all the House of Austria have lost, within these Ten Years, what would this avail us, if our own Nation is impoverish'd, our most-able bodied Men exhausted, and our Commerce irretrievably lost? All All of which, are the probable Consequences, of our engaging now in a Land-War. We say of engaging now, because we must engage, at ten times the Disadvantage, we did formerly, in Queen Anne's Reign; as will be shewn presently, in its

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proper Place.

But, perhaps it may be faid, we may possibly enlarge our Dominions, by obtaining some Territories on the Continent, which may add to the Splendour of our Crown; and give more Weight to our Influence, whether we are to declare War, or enter into Negotiations, with any of our Neighbouring Potentates. Our Answer is, Heaven forbid, fo wild a Thought, should ever find Entrance into our Brains; we know but of one Place, besides what we already have, on the whole Continent of Europe, which could be of any Service to us, and that is Dunkirk; which cannot fail, of proving a great Thorn in our Sides, whilst in the Hands of the French, in Case of Rupture; and even that, our good Allies, would never affift us to reduce; they would not, in all the late glorious, and successful War, though we were then continually adding, not only Towns, but whole Provinces, to their Dominions. Besides, we would fain ask, what Weight have the German Territories, under the Government of our Sovereign, given, at any Time, to our Measures?

We have found them, indeed, of some Weight, but then it has been to our Disadvantage; they have been of sufficient Weight, to draw away from us, too frequently, the Persons of our Princes; we hope not their Affections, nor our Treasures; tho even that has been often suggested, but we are far from giving any Credit to it. Nay, it has been pretty publickly infinuated, by many, that they have been a dead Weight to us, on several Occa-

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fions, by preventing us, from exerting ourselves, for our own true Interest, whenever it has been thought incompatible, with that of those favourite P-ss-ss-ns; and drawing us into Measures, altogether inconsistent with our own Welfare. Some have even pretended, to account, by this means, for most of our Meafures, of late Years; for which, otherwise, no tolerable Reason could be affigured. Accordingly, to this they ascribe the Treaty of Hanover, which threw us into the Arms of France, our natural Enemy, and astonish'd all Mankind; in order to reduce, the exorbitant Power of the Emperor, which fay they, gave Umbrage to a certain El-or, and was therefore to be brought lower. To this, likewise, they ascribe, the memorable Treaty of Seville, which stipulated the Introduction, of Spanish Troops into Tuscany, and paved the Way for the Revolution, which happened foon after, and stript his Imperial Majesty, of all his Possessions in Italy. To this, also, they ascribe, our continuing inactive, though the Emperor was not only attack'd, at once, by France, Spain, and Sardinia in Italy, but in Germany also by the former, and reduced to the last Extremity.

Nay, they pretend to account, hereby, even for our present Conduct; and say, our engaging so heartily, at present, is owing to the Resentment of a Visit, made by Maillebois to a certain El—te; and the Fear, that another Prince of the Empire, may grow too powerful in his Turn, if the Queen of Hungary should be reduced too low. We are far, however, from giving Credit to any of these Suggestions; because it has ever been received, as an undeniable Maxim in Politicks, to which there has never, heretofore, been found an Exception, that when a smaller State is united to a greater, so as to come under the Do-

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minion of the same Prince, the smaller must of Course, become dependent upon the greater, as the latter must necessarily be the Seat of Empire: Whereas, should we believe these Insinuations, the Instuence of the lesser Dominion, has always been too strong for that of the greater, and has occasion'd such Alterations, in the Political System of Europe, as could never have been foreseen, and would not

bave been believed, if prophesied.

However, be this as it will, and leaving these Matters to be decided by others, as being above our Sphere, thus much is certain; that any Pofsessions on the Continent, must be bigbly prejudicial to Great-Britain; as they would deprive us, of the most considerable Benefits, we enjoy, through our bappy Situation; which are, that no Power can invade us, but at an infinite Disadvantage; and that we need not be involved, in any of the Quarrels, between our Neighbours on the Continent, unless we please; and, even then, it need only be upon our own Terms. Any Possessions, therefore, on the main Land, which were not confiderable enough to support themselves, in Case of being attack'd, either by their own Strength, or through the Means of natural Allies, who are interested in their Preservation, would be so far from proving beneficial, that they might, in Time, be fatal to us, by being perpetual Drains of our Treasure; and drawing us into fo many Disputes, on their Account, as might cost us more, than the Value of their whole Feefimple, might be able to defray.

Even GIBRALTAR, the only Place we have, or we hope, ever shall have, upon the Continent of Europe, would not be worth our keeping, were it not impregnable by Land, and easily relieved, in Case of a Siege, as long as we are Masters of the Sea: Nor would Dunkirk

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be worth our Acceptance, if offered us, but that it might be render'd fo, on the Land-fide, by laying the Country around it under Water, whenever we pleased; and might defy all Attacks by Sea, whilst we reign Sovereigns of the Channel. which, we flatter ourselves, will be, till Time is no more. The former, therefore, of these Fortresses, as it secures us, the Command of the Streights, that important Inlet into the Mediterranean, is of infinite Value; and might be render'd of prodigious Service to us, though we can't fay, it has hitherto been of much, by a prudent Conduct; and the latter, had we been fuffer'd to keep it, in the Condition it was then in, as we might have done, at the Peace of Utrecht, had we had an bonest Ministry, by rendering us absolute Masters, of both Sides of the Channel, would have secured us, in a great Measure, from the Depredations and Infults of our Enemies, under our very Noses, if we may use that Expression; nor should we have heard, of fo many balf French, balf Spanish Privateers, who have lain in wait, to map up our Merchant Men, almost at our own Doors. UNHAPPY BRITONS! Scarce ever to have one Ministry, who have consulted your true Interest!

It was generally expected, upon the Dismission of our late State-Leviathan, that we should have seen better Times; and that more salutary Measures would have been follow'd; but, by what Fatality it has been prevented, we know not, we have been bitherto disappointed; we are willing, however, still to hope, that Things will soon take a more savourable Turn, for these unfortunate Kingdoms; and that the inauspicious, and baneful Planet, or rather Constellation, which has lately been predominant, and shed its malevolent Instuences, over the British Counsels, will be quickly ba-

nished our Horizon; by the propitious Conjunction of Saturn, Jupiter, and Mercury, in a Trine Aspect, portending Peace, Plenty, Content, and unclogg'd Liberty, (with a flourishing and extended Commerce, free from all Restraints, and beavy Duties,)

to these once more bappy Realms.

All these Bleffings, great as they are, would be the necessary Consequences of wise Measures; as the very Reverse, will always be the Effect, of weak and imprudent Undertakings: How maturely ought we, then, to weigh all our Steps, when so prodigious is the Difference, between a well regulated Conduct, and the contrary! Good Management, and Forecast, is of as much Consequence, in publick Affairs, as in private Life; and what should we fay to a Man, who, being about to engage in any Bufiness, did not first sit down, and consider, whether bis Gains were likely, to be more than tantamount to bis Losses, and the Expence of carrying it on? Should we not reckon him very weak, and unadvised; undoubtedly we should! How much more, then, should we deem him so, who should embark in any Affair, wherein his probable Gains, were not only highly unlikely, ever to make a near Compensation, for his Losses, and the Charge of Management, but wherein the least Miscarriage, or ill Success, might possibly be attended, with the most fatal Effects?

We have more than human Authority, to justify us, in blaming the Conduct of that Prince, who, being able to raise but an Army of Ten Thousand Men, should think of coping with another, who could bring Twenty Thousand against him: And were it not, that few Statesmen, trouble their Heads with the Scripture, we could wish those Counsellors, who advised us, to engage so precipitately, in the present Land-War, after we had so

long continued quiet Spectators thereof, and fuffer'd her Hungarian Majesty to be so greatly weaken'd, (which might have been prevented, by timely Affistance,) had first read Luke, xiv. 31, 32, and calmly weigh'd it. But, perhaps, it may be anfwer'd, there is no Similitude between our Cafe, at present, and that of the King there mentioned; that our Army is, at least, equal, if not superior, to that of our Enemies; and that we have already fhewn, we are able to cope with them. Suppose we should grant this, what then! Supposing, instead of a drawn Battle, or a Victory, which the French still dispute with us, we had undeniably gained the better, and had kill'd them Ten Thoufand Men, whilst we had lost but balf the Number; would this have been any great Matter of Triumph to us? Are not our Enemies able to support Ten fuch Defeats? On the contrary, should not we be pretty much in the fame Case, with the famous Pyrrbus, King of Epirus; who, after having gained an indisputable Advantage over the Romans, but at a dear Rate, and being complimented thereon, by his Officers and Courtiers, very wifely answer'd, Such another Victory would undo me.

In Effect, though we will not affirm, that we should not be able to bear up, under one or two dear-bought Victories, or even as many Defeats, yet we will venture to submit it, to the serious Consideration, of any thinking and impartial Person, whether, supposing this War were to be equally successful, with that in the immortal, glorious, Queen Anne's Reign, (which by the bye, is highly improbable) there is any Likelibood, a Nation, already sinking, under the intolerable Load, of such beavy Taxes as we pay, should be able to support it? Or whether the Queen of Hungary's, already, impoverished, and almost depopulated Dominions, and

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her exhausted Finances, can be any great Assistance to us, should the War be protracted to any Length of Time? And, if we are neither able of ourselves, nor, with the Help of her Hungarian Majesty, to support the Burthen of a consuming Land-War, for any Continuance, we would beg our Country-men, seriously to consider, what we are about.

Perhaps, it will be answered, we shall be joined, likewise, by the Dutch, and it may be, by the King of Prussia: Supposing this were so, would this mend Matters mightily? We are afraid not. As to the States-General, it is well known, bow unwilling they were to engage with us at all, if they can be faid, to have engaged yet; which is to be doubted: And, as to his Prushan Majesty, we are apprehensive, his Friendship is of so very late standing, that it is as yet pretty much to be sufpetted. Besides, should we, for once grant, that they would now engage beartily, on our fide, which is much to be questioned, especially of the Dutch; fo greatly do they stand in Awe, of their too formidable Neighbours, the French; does not every one fee, it would be only upon their own Terms; and bow advantagious this would be to us, we leave every one to judge, who has but the least Knowledge, of that artful, politick, and felfinterested People.

They call themselves a Nation of Traders, and not without good Reason; for such will every one find them, who has any Dealings with them. They treat, as a State, in the same Manner, as each Individual, does in his private Capacity; just so much for your Penny, and no more, will you get of Hans, behind his Counter; and just as much for your Penny, and no more, will you obtain of their High Mightinesses, when assembled in a Body:

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Accordingly, we shall be fure, to have almost the whole Burthen of the War thrown upon us; whilft the Dutch, by the Remittances, which must pass through their Hands, and the great Circulation of Money, our Army will occasion, in the Low-Countries, will be little or no Sufferers. should all Intercourse, between us and the French. be stops, as must be, in case we become Principals in the War, (which now feems unavoidable,) they may possibly be Gainers thereby; since we shall not be able to procure either French Wines, Brandies, Brocades, Silks, or Cambricks, those Articles of Luxury, we now have directly from France, (and from which our Publick-spirited Nobility and Gentry, will not abstain, though the Safety or Ruin of the Nation depended thereon) but, by the Way of Holland; as the French, on the other Hand, must be beholding to the Dutch, for all

the English Commodities they want.

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We have feen, then, that the Accession of the Dutch, to our Measures, will be of very little Benefit to us; and as for his Prussian Majesty, should he join his Troops to ours, it is very certain, he would expect a considerable Subsidy; and from whence, in the Name of wonder, is all the Money to come? Had we acted, indeed, as our prudent Neighbours did, and as every wife Nation would, during above Twenty Years Peace, that we enjoy'd, or at least, might have enjoy'd, had we so pleased; had we improved, we say, that bappy Opportunity, after their Example, by easing the Subject, in every possible Respect; by taking off all the most burthensome Taxes; by giving all Manner of Encouragement to our Manufacturies, and American Colonies; by keeping up no useles Land Forces, at Home, and granting no unnecessary Subfidies, for foreign Troops abroad; by fitting out no peaceable

peaceable Squadrons, for Raree-Shews, and Ridicule; by retrenching all needless Expences, and paying off, as fast as possible, all the publick Debis; especially such as were most grievous to the industrious Poor; had we done all this, we fay once again, we might probably, now, have been in a Condition, to have engaged in another Ten Years Land War, had it been absolutely necessary; which can hardly ever be our Case, Thanks to divine Providence! But, after a Peace! fuch as we did enjoy; a Peace! with all the Inconveniencies, and none of the Advantages, of War! a Peace! wherein we paid, yearly, as much in Taxes, as during the War in Queen Anne's Reign, and fometimes more! a Peace! wherein we kept up a more numerous Army, and fitted out more formidable Fleets, than during that whole glorious Period! and yet a Peace! during which we suffered the most outragious Insults! A Peace! in short, whereof it be truly faid,

In Vain the HARRASS'D Britons bop'd for EASE, Whilf growing Taxes were the Fruits of PEACE.

After such a Peace! we say, wherein we connived at the Reparation of the Harbour of Dunkirk; at our Wool's being openly conveyed from us, and our Men inlisted into the Service of the French, for Fear of provoking them; in short, a Peace! during which we have suffered almost every Branch of our Trade to be lost, whilst scarce a Penny of our Debts, have been paid off, what Probability is there, of our bearing up under a tedious Land-War? It would be mere Madness to think of it.

Iu Effect, we must commence a War, at prefent, at ten Times the Disadvantage, as formerly; we are not only much weaker, but our Enemies much stronger, than in the Reigns of King William, or our late excellent Queen. At that Juncture, di-

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his present Catholick Majesty, Philip V. was but just advanced to the Throne of Spain; and there was a powerful Party in the Kingdom, who were not very well satisfied with his Promotion; but were disposed to revolt, as soon as they could be assured of being supported, which they accordingly did. But the Case is quite different now, when the Spaniards have been accustomed to his Sway, above Forty Years, and the Crown is sirmly settled on his Head: Add to this, that the his Subjects having been inured to War, for a long Term of Years, there are now several Thousands of hardy Veterans, and excellent Officers, amongst them; whereas they were before, almost

as wretched Soldiers, as the Portugueze.

Again, by the late unfortunate Cession of Lorain, (which was, in a great Measure, owing to our Supineness, and Indolence,) France has acquired an undoubted Right, to that fertile and rich Dutchy; the Possession of which, by Reason of its bappy Situation, is of infinite Importance: In Effect, it is not only a considerable Addition, in point of Strength, to the French Crown, as it can raise and maintain 25,000 Men; but as it secures their Frontier, on that Side where it was most exposed; and may be made, at the same Time, a Key, to let the Armies of France into the Empire, when they please; and before the Germans can have any Notice of their Delign, or put themselves in a Posture of Defence. By the Accession, therefore, of this Dutchy, it is evident, that France is much more powerful, than at the Beginning of the late War; and if she was, then, able to support a constant Series of ill-Success, and so many signal Defeats, for Ten Years, what may she not now do? Yet again, the French, at that Time, had little or no Trade; and consequently were less able to bear fuch

fuch terrible Overthrows, and the beavy Taxes, their Prince was thereby necessitated, to lay upon them: Whereas they have now a very stourishing, and extended Commerce, insomuch, that they have, in a great Measure, supplanted us in divers of the most beneficial Branches thereof, particularly in our

Trade to Spain, Turkey, and the Levant.

But, to add our Misfortune, the French are not only much stronger, than they were at the beginning of the late War, but we are much weaker, in feveral Respects; we were not only heartily affifted then, by the Emperor, the Dutch, and the Duke of Savoy, but by Denmark, and the several Princes of the Empire, as Prussia, Saxony, Hanover, &c. And, which was no inconfiderable Advantage, our Armies were then beaded by a Marlborough, and an Eugene, that is, Two of the greatest Generals the World ever produced. Besides, our Trade was then in a very prosperous Condition, and we had no Rivals of any Confequence therein; fo that it was a continual Source of Riches to us, and enabled us to support many beavy Taxes; and to crown all, our Debts were then but very trifling.

Whilst we were in this bappy State, neither overburthen'd with Debts, nor grievous Tanes, the inseparable Consequences thereof, it was no wonder, if we did venture to engage in a Land-War; especially, when it was not only to prevent all Europe's being over-run by France, but to oppose the Imposition of a bigotted Tyrant upon us; and revenge a most unpardonable Affront, to the late Queen, by proclaiming the Pretender, rightful Sovereign of these Kingdoms, in direct Violation of the Treaty of Ryswick. These, it must be owned, by all, were notorious Provocations, and very urgent Reasons, for exerting our selves in an extraordinary Manner; and yet, every one knows, when

that War was spun out to a great Length, how heartily weary the Nation grew of it, and what Clamours it occasioned; notwithstanding the Glory we were every Day acquiring, (a Thing highly agreeable to the British Nation) and the unparallell'd, and uninterrupted, Success that attended our Arms.

In Effect, what did Great Britain gain, by that Profusion of Blood and Treasure, so prodigally lavish'd in that War? Are Gibraltar, and Port-Mabon, an Equivalent, for the Thousands of brave Men, who loft their Lives, and above a Hundred Millions of Money expended therein? Don't we fill groan, under the intelerable Pressure, of the Debts contracted on that Occasion? And are we now entering upon Measures, which must probably cost us as much more? Must not the Consequence be inevitable Ruin? And, after we are well drained of our Men and Money, and the little Trade we have left is entirely loft, (as it must be in all Likelyhood,) must we not, of Course, fall an easy Prey to the first Invader? Such is the melancholy Scene we have now before us.

Our gracious Sovereign, who has been made confitantly to believe, that we are a very rich, and flourishing People, that Great Britain is an inexhaustible
Mine of Wealth; and that all Opposition to his
Measures, (as all the most pernicious ministerial
Schemes, have been modestly called,) proceeded
solely from our enjoying too much Liberty, and
Plenty, is not apprized, of the wretched Condition, of
his faithful Subjects; but, in all probability, imagines us, to be naturally a turbulent, dissatisfied,
and even seditious Nation. Nor is this any Wonder, if we consider, for how many Years, he was
suffered to see only through the Eyes, and to heen
only through the Ears, of One, who was, demonstrably,

trably, in an open Conspiracy, against the Liberties and Prosperity of his Country. When we consider this, we fay, and at the same Time, reflect, that even the most destructive of his Measures, the Excise Scheme, if common Report may be credited, was represented to his Majesty, as a most salutary and beneficial Project, calculated purely to prevent the most notorious Frauds, and improve the public Revenue; and that it was render'd abortive, only by a Combination of STURDY BEGGARS, grown wanton, through too much Affluence; wanting to be humbled; And supported by a disaffected Party, in both Houses; where is the wonder, if our Prince, who judges of others, by his own noble and generous Soul, should be prepossessed with Notions, not much to our Advantage; and should think, we are well able, to bear the Expence and Burthen, of the present Land-War?

But, were he made truly acquainted, with the real State of these unhappy Kingdoms; that they are so far, from being capable of Struggling with any fresh Load, that they are already just sinking, under the Weight of their present beavy Taxes; and that the least additional Pressure must infallibly put the finishing Stroke to their Ruin; that a Land-War, is of all Measures, the most likely to compleat our De-Arustion; as it must necessarily impoverish, and infeeble us the most, by being a continual Drain, both of our Treasure, and most able bodied men; whereas, in a Sea-War, much the greatest Part, of the Provision, and all the Warlike Stores, are taken in at Home, or fent after the Fleet in Tenders; and the Ships being constantly paid off, in our own Ports, the Money is always expended among ft ourselves, which creates a quick Circulation, and brisk inland Trade; Two Circumstances bigbly worthy the Consideration of an almost exbausted

bausted People: Add to this, that in the most bloody and unfortunate Sea-War, we ever engaged in, the yearly Loss of Sailors, was never near equal to that of Soldiers, in any one of the Campaigns, under King William, the Duke of Marlborough, or in Spain; on the contrary, that generally speaking, it never required balf the Number of Sea-men, to recruit the Navy, as it did of Land-

men, to repair the Losses of the Army:

Were his Majesty, we say, made fully sensible. of this our wretched Condition, and of all these Difadvantages of a Land-War; as also, of the great Advantage, our Superiority, by Sea, gives us over our Enemies: We are well affured, he is a Prince of so much Humanity and Prudence, as likewise so tenderly concerned for the Welfare of his People, he would never engage us in a Step. which must necessarily prove so fatal to us, should the War be protracted to any Length. In Effect. though, we are aware, this Position will be thought very odd, by most Folks, we will venture to affirm, that it is neither the true Interest of his Majesty himself, nor of his German Dominions, to involve Great Britain, in a consuming Land-War; on the contrary, that even the Safety of the former, is now dependant, in some Measure, upon the Welfare of the latter; or, in other Words, that the Ruin of these Kingdoms, must necessarily, and inevitably, draw after them, the Ruin of the Electorate of Hanover, with all the Territories annex'd thereto.

To make this plain, we shall only observe, what has been advanced before, that so much exbausted, as we are already, by the Decay of our Trade, our numerous and heavy Taxes and Debts, it will be impossible for us, long to support, a War upon the Continent, without sinking under the

Weight

Weight of it: That, on the contrary, our Enemies, having taken Advantage of the long Peace they enjoy'd, to pay off most Part of their Debts, and give all Manner of Encouragment to Irade, in all its Branches, by easing the Manufacturer of the most burthensome Taxes, and not only discouraging, but even probibiting the Wear of all foreign Merchandize, (in which Piece of found policy, and public Spirit, we have always been too wife to follow their Example) are better able, now support, another Ten Years War, than they were in the Reign of Lewis XIV; even though it should prove as unsuccessful, as that, in the time of their late Grand Monarque; which is altogether unlikely. Let us suppose, then, for once, that our Armies will be bles'd, with as uninterrupted Success, as in the the late Queen's Reign, though that is highly improbable; the infallible Consequence of that would be, that we should at last fink under our own Efforts, and be forced to elap up a Peace at any Rate; for, fuch prodigious Sums of Money, must be fent yearly out of the Kingdom, to pay our Forces, whilft, the little Trade, we have yet left, would be then entirely loft, as it certainly must, that the Ballance would be greatly against us; and we should be so far, from recruiting ourselves thereby, that other considerable Remittances, must be made abroad, to pay the Overplus; fo that these Two continual Drains of our Treasure, would, in a few Years, enhaust us of all our Specie; which rendering us utterly unable, to carry on even a defenfive War, must leave us an easy Prey, to the first Invader. And, as we are fenfible, our good Neighbours, whom we have been, fo long, wifely contributing to aggrandize, don't want the Inclination, if they bad but the Power, we must soon become a Province to them. This, we fay, is the

the evident Consequence, of our persisting, in the Prosecution of a Land-War; and, should this ever be our melancholy Case, which Heaven forbid, we leave any one to judge, whether the Electorate of Hanover, must not follow of Course; especially, as, it is no Secret, that our Enemies, ascribe the carrying the War, into the French Dominions, to the sole Influence, and Direction, of our most gracious Sovereign.

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